In Focus

Moments that matter

Turning near misses into life-saving lessons

Vera Rosa

SHOT, United Kingdom

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Shruthi Narayan

SHOT, United Kingdom

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Near Misses (NM) are events that could have resulted in harm but were detected before reaching the patient. Drawing on Serious Hazards of Transfusion (SHOT) haemovigilance data, World Health Organisation (WHO) and Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) safety principles, cross-sector evidence, and improvement experience, this article outlines the importance of NM and how they can be used to build proactive and resilient safety systems.

What is NM and why they matter

SHOT defines a transfusion NM when errors, if undetected, could have resulted in a transfusion of a wrong blood group or wrong blood component. WHO and IHI positive NM as critical learning opportunities within a systems-based safety approach, aligning with Safety-II thinking that values what goes right as well as what goes wrong.

NM occurs more frequently than actual adverse events, making them a rich source of data on underlying system vulnerabilities. Because no patient has been harmed, it is more likely that staff feel psychologically safe to discuss these events, which supports open reporting and learning cultures when leadership responds constructively rather than punitively.

SHOT data: NM and wrong blood in tube (WBIT) events

SHOT has collected and analysed transfusion NM for more than two decades. These currently account for approximately 40% of all SHOT reports. WBIT, represent more than half of the transfusion NM. The most common factors associated with WBIT are not positively identifying the patient at bedside and labelling the samples away from the patient, often in busy environments such as emergency departments and wards.

Other NM reportable to SHOT include wrong component selection, documentation errors, or laboratory processing issues that are intercepted before component administration. These events signal weaknesses in identification, workflow, communication, digital systems, and local culture that can compromise safety if not addressed.

SHOT data from 2016-2024 show that there were 32 ABOi red cell transfusions during this period, however there were 2593 NM which could have resulted in an ABOi transfusion. When NM are not identified or investigated, they represent missed opportunities that can contribute to future risks of potentially lethal ABOi.

A six-year review (2017–2022) of the UK SHOT haemovigilance data found 21 ABO-incompatible red cell transfusions, including two deaths and four cases of major morbidity, largely caused by failures in patient identification within clinical settings. Multiple errors across the transfusion pathway revealed recurring issues such as incorrect patient checks, wrong-unit collection, and sampling mistakes. Although safety barriers like checklists and electronic blood management systems helped prevent many potential ABO-incompatible events, they were not consistently or robustly applied.

ABO-incompatible red cell transfusions 2016-2024 reported to SHOT: Few events (n=32) but many NM (n=2593)

Here are a couple of illustrative examples from previous Annual SHOT Reports that highlight the importance and impact of recording, reviewing and acting on NM transfusion events:

Case-study 1: NM helps to identify safety issues with requesting electronic system A unit of red cells was collected by a porter using the porter electronic system. The unit collected was for a different patient. Both patients had the same surname; however, no other patient details matched the blood request. When the blood component arrived at the ward and the details were checked, the error was identified and reported to the laboratory. The red cell unit was returned to the laboratory.

An investigation revealed that the porter’s electronic system was not fit for purpose, prompting a full review by the hospital transfusion team and related committees. Safety issues were communicated trust-wide, new processes were defined in an updated SOP and flow chart, and a communication package was issued to all relevant staff. Porters were instructed not to collect blood components without full patient details, and a new escalation pathway and audit schedule are being introduced to ensure sustained improvements at ward level.

Case-study 2: Multiple errors contributed to the misidentification of a sample

Patient 1 in the emergency department (ED) required a red cell transfusion and was identified by an incorrect bed space number instead of their name. During a single venepuncture, the doctor took both a group and screen sample and a confirmatory sample from patient 2, with no positive patient identification performed. The doctor labelled the first sample away from the patient’s side using patient 1’s details. They then asked a nurse to label the second sample and send it to the laboratory. The error was detected when the blood samples were tested in the transfusion laboratory. Patient 1 had a historical group of O D-negative with positive red cell antibodies, while the current samples were grouped as AB D-positive.

This case highlights multiple errors in positive patient identification and sample labelling procedures which could have resulted in an ABOi red cell transfusion. The first and the confirmatory samples for group and screen should be taken at different times, preferably by different staff. The person taking the sample should be the person that labels it, and this must be done next to the patient.

Learning proactively: WHO, IHI and cross‑sector principles

WHO’s patient safety frameworks emphasise a systems approach, just culture, and learning from “unsafe conditions, hazards and near misses” as part of an integrated safety management system. IHI’s work on adverse event detection and trigger tools reinforces the need to move from reactive investigation of harm towards proactive surveillance for risk signals across the care pathway.

Cross‑sector reflections on NM, including Woodier’s work, highlight several recurring principles: NM often share the same underlying causes as serious incidents, they frequently precede them in time, and they reveal “latent conditions” in design, resourcing, and culture that are not visible from rare catastrophic events alone. Learning from NM therefore requires more than counting; it demands structured analysis, involvement of those closest to the work, and system‑level responses across people, processes, and technology.

These principles align closely with SHOT’s approach, which couples descriptive analysis of NM patterns (such as the predominance of WBIT) with practical recommendations on identification processes, training, and the use of technologies such as barcode scanning. When applied consistently, this turns NM into a continuous feedback loop for system improvement rather than isolated “lucky escapes”.

Evidence from studies on NM reporting reducing transfusion errors

Studies consistently show that structured NM reporting reduces transfusion risk by exposing systemic gaps early and guiding targeted interventions. Dedicated systems such as MERS TM, which captured 819 events in 19 months, demonstrated that NM occur five times more often than actual errors and that 68% of errors were intercepted before blood was issued, enabling teams to identify patterns such as wrong-patient samples and mislabelling and to track whether corrective actions reduce recurrence.

Sixteen years of SHOT data show that analysing NM patterns has directly shaped national practice, strengthening patient identification standards, sampling policies, training, and supporting the adoption of electronic positive patient identification.

Crucially, learning from NM is as valuable as learning from actual incidents but without the psychological and physical harm associated with them. Lessons from NM drive improvements across healthcare organisations by enabling shared learning and supporting risk-mitigating actions. To achieve this, organisations must foster a culture where staff feel psychologically safe to report without fear of blame or negative consequences, supported by system-focused rather than person-focused investigations. However, the 2023 SHOT and UKTLC transfusion laboratory culture survey highlighted persistent concerns, including laboratory staff experiencing incivility or disciplinary action after raising safety issues or submitting incident reports. The report includes recommendations to help organisations build psychological safety, and it emphasises that NM investigation must be fully embedded in policy and resourced appropriately so staff can understand—and act on—their critical role in improving patient safety.

Mechanisms by which NM reporting reduces risk Across these sources, several mechanisms link NM reporting to reductions in transfusion errors:

  • Identification of high‑risk steps: NM data reveal exactly where pre‑transfusion processes fail most often, allowing targeted redesign of sampling, labelling and checking procedures.
  • Detection of latent conditions: Aggregated NM expose system issues such as staffing gaps, workload pressures, poor layout, or confusing forms before they cause harm – this is evident from the human factors principles-based analysis of NM reported to SHOT.
  • Monitoring impact of interventions: Systems such as MERS‑TM were explicitly used to “monitor changes in frequency after corrective action”, enabling teams to see whether specific interventions reduced particular error types
  • Culture and vigilance: No‑fault reporting and visible learning from NM support a stronger safety culture, which is associated in broader patient‑safety literature with lower serious error rates

Strategies to boost NM reporting rates in hospitals

To boost NM reporting, organisations must tackle the main barriers—fear of blame, lack of clarity, weak leadership support, and clunky systems—by creating a just, learning culture where staff feel safe and valued for speaking up. Clear no-blame messages, visible appreciation for “good catches,” and simplified, integrated reporting systems make reporting easier and less intimidating, while options for anonymous submissions further reduce fear. Staff need regular, practical education on what constitutes a NM and why it matters, reinforced through huddles, induction, and real examples such as WBIT. Crucially, timely feedback, simple dashboards, and recognition of individuals and teams show that reporting leads to action, strengthening trust and closing the learning loop. Together, these strategies make NM reporting quicker, safer, and genuinely meaningful.

NM are among the most valuable but most likely underused sources of safety intelligence in healthcare. SHOT data clearly show that NM, particularly WBIT, provide early warnings of the very failures that cause serious transfusion incidents. Evidence from haemovigilance systems, structured reporting tools, and hospital-level studies demonstrates that learning from NM reduces risk, strengthens safety culture, and improves resource use. By embedding NM into everyday clinical and laboratory improvement—making reporting simple, analysis routine, actions visible, and feedback timely—healthcare organisations can move upstream of harm and deliver safer transfusion practice and safer care overall.

References

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